Reports and Lies

We are accustomed to reading the most arrant nonsense about Adolf Hitler. According to this stream of black propaganda (which started as long ago as the 1920s), Hitler was savage, unforgiving, tyrannical, vituperative, uneducated, a down-and-out from the gutter, a house-painter, sexually perverse, an erotomaniac, impotent, excessively interested in women, a gay, mad, sometimes mad, occasionally mad, only interested in his own material benefit, a tax dodger, even harsh toward his beloved dog, Blondie!

In Hitler’s own lifetime, a pack of lies was spewed out by his enemies: Jewish elements and interests; the Communists and Socialists who, many of them, supported or condoned Stalinism; also journalists working, in effect, for those same groups. During the Second World War, the Soviet Union and the Western Allies maintained huge ministries and agencies dedicated to “black propaganda”. After 1945 the baton was passed to the increasingly prevalent Jewish or Zionist lobby and its major offshoot, the “holocaust” industry, aided by historians who knew that their careers depended on not challenging the approved narrative.

The “Hitler was a house-painter” story seems to have come from a Jesuit priest who was taken to hear Hitler in Munich in or about 1920. He asked what Hitler was (at that time Hitler had few followers and was unknown outside the city); the answer came, “I think that he is a painter of houses” (no doubt a garbled version, heard somewhere, of Hitler’s pre-WW1 life as a struggling art student and painter). In the 1930s, Churchill took up that false version of Hitler’s life as a young man, no doubt calculating that English snobbery would be inherently biased against a political leader with a past involving painting houses or the like. Even today, one occasionally sees reference to Hitler “painting houses”.

The idea that Hitler was “mad” came from an anti-Hitler newspaper editor (probably the half-Jewish scribbler Konrad Heiden), who, in the 1930s, told the American correspondent and anti-Hitler propagandist William Shirer (who posed as an historian after 1945) that Hitler was a “Teppichfresser” (“carpet-chewer”), meaning prone to bouts of insanity when he would supposedly curl up in rage on the carpet and chew the edge of the same. A complete invention, which has coloured the popular view of Hitler ever since, though even the Jewish historians no longer make the exact allegation.

As to the stories and speculations about Hitler’s  sex life, I should imagine that every possibility has now been explored by journalists and historians eager to reduce Adolf Hitler to a sort of freak show. Needless to say, the most likely possibility (that Hitler was “normal” but unenthusiastic) is of little interest, being unlikely to sell books or newspapers.

A more recent allegation has been that Hitler was a drug addict. Again untrue, though there is at least a kernel of fact underpinning this one, in that Hitler’s doctor, Morell, was a medical innovator who did tend to experiment on his patients. Hitler demanded results; Morell tried to provide them:

(actually, though many have quailed at Morell’s preparations, such as the ones that included “intestinal bacteria”, these were the basis for the now-popular “active” yoghurt health drinks for the stomach now found next to the milkshakes in every UK supermarket).

What about Hitler as a vengeful tyrant? This seems to rest mainly on his reaction to the 1944 plotters, who, in the midst of Germany’s fight for survival, saw fit to blow up Hitler and the German High Command at Rastenburg in East Prussia (now in Poland). Yes, they were executed, some cruelly, it seems, but would it have been much different in, say, England, had Churchill been blown up by “traitors” at Ditchley Park (in, perhaps, 1940), alongside his military and naval chiefs?

In reality, Hitler was not a vengeful type. Anton Drexler, the locksmith who founded the then DAP which Hitler joined in 1919, had a serious quarrel with Hitler in 1921. He wrote a letter accusing Hitler of “acting like a Jew, twisting every fact” (!), was removed as head of the party (replaced by Hitler) and was given a purely figurehead position until he resigned in 1924, after which he was elected to the Bavarian Parliament for another party, serving as elected member until 1928. Despite that, Drexler was readmitted to the NSDAP in 1933, honoured (though not given any political position) and died peacefully in 1942. One cannot imagine Stalin treating a similar case the same way!

Another example. The first reports about an attempted putsch in Munich in 1923 (the Beer Hall Putsch, also known as the Hitler-Ludendorff-Putsch), reached the ears of a police commander called Sigmund von Imhoff, who contacted the Reichswehr commander of the city and seized the telephone and telegraph exchange. He was probably the most important reason that the putsch failed (amid bloodshed, Hitler himself being injured as the main march was brought to a halt).

One can well imagine what Stalin, on attaining power, would have done with an officer such as von Imhoff, but under Hitler he was not punished. On the contrary, he was promoted to Police General in 1933 and, in WW2, seconded to the Luftwaffe with the rank of Major General (he died in Bavaria in 1967).

This article could be ten times or a hundred longer, so many lies about Hitler and the Reich have been told and continue to be told. However, the few examples above perhaps will give pause to those who imagine that they have been told the truth about those world-historic events of the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s.

Tipping Points in Politics and Life

We have all heard of the theatrical cliche of the actor who achieves “overnight success”, having in fact worked hard against all the odds for years. The same is often true of writers, painters and other artists. Not forgetting scientists. It was Edison who, on the failure of his (supposedly) 2,000th lightbulb experiment, is said to have said: “I have not failed. I have just discovered the 2,000th way not to invent the incandescent lightbulb.” At a later time, he of course succeeded. Many things follow the pattern: a long period of non-movement, then sudden success (or sudden failure of something, often after long stagnation).

One can call this a tipping-point, or characterize it by some other metaphor. The aircraft which suddenly fails by reason of metal fatigue, the ship which finally turns over after ice has built up on its external structure in Arctic waters, the huge empire which “suddenly” staggers and falls. On the other hand, there is that actor with his “overnight” success, that composer whose works suddenly find favour, the small political group which “suddenly” rises to prominence and power.

The Bolsheviks were a small group of societal rejects mostly living in internal or external exile, or in prison. Many were not even Russian. Jews predominated in their higher councils (despite forming only 10% of the entire membership), but there were also Georgians and others. In fact, the Bolshevik Party only had 8,400 members in 1905 and, though that increased to 46,100 by 1907, by 1910 the numbers had slipped back to about 5,000. Few would then have imagined either that the mighty Russian Empire would collapse or that the tiny faction of Bolsheviks could seize control of what was left. We know the rest: a failing war and an impoverished population, an initial attempt by others at “moderate” revolution and then a coup d’etat by one small group in one corner of a vast empire.

The lesson: a small and marginalized group, disciplined ideologically and practically, can both seize power and institute an entirely new form of society, once that tipping point or crisis point has been reached.

In post-WW1 Bavaria, Adolf Hitler became the 7th member of the German Workers’ Party [DAP], which may also have had an unknown number (estimates vary from mere dozens to as many as 15,000) of loose supporters in the beerhalls of 1919 Munich.

By 1923, this tiny and marginalized group was able to attempt the Beer Hall Putsch [aka Hitler-Ludendorff-Putsch], but it is important to note that, despite the support of Ludendorff and a few other notables, the actual number of putschists involved was small: the main march headed by Hitler was only 2,000-strong (immediately after the putsch failed, 3,000 students from the university also marched in support and to lay wreaths). Indeed, even had the putsch succeeded, Hitler would only have taken power in one city of one region within the German state as a whole.

The membership of the NSDAP grew steadily, reaching 108,000 by 1928. Electorally, however, the NSDAP was doing worse in 1928 (receiving only 2.6% of the national vote) than it had done in 1924, no doubt a reflection of the growing prosperity in the intervening years (i.e. since the infamous hyperinflation finished in 1924). Despite that poor showing, once the Great Depression started to affect Germany after 1929, the NSDAP was able to gain the trust of ever-more voters: the vote in 1932 was 37% and then 33% (in the two elections of that year), growing to 44% in 1933. Adolf Hitler then took full power, having been appointed Chancellor in 1932.

A different example: UKIP grew from a few people in a pub in 1991 to a peak in the 2012-2015 period, but has not the ideological discipline or revolutionary intent to “seize power” even by electoral means. It missed its chance and will probably not get any further. Still, its growth, in the UK context, is interesting. Its founder, Alan Sked, was a former Liberal candidate who stood as “Anti-Federalist” candidate for the seat of Bath in 1992 (i.e. after UKIP had been formed), receiving 117 votes [0.2%].

UKIP had virtually no members until the late 1990s, though by 2015 the membership had grown to nearly 50,000 (now 30,000). As for its vote share, that grew to nearly 13% by 2015, but the UK’s unfair “First Past The Post” [FPTP] electoral system meant no gains.

FPTP voting itself illustrates the “tipping point” idea, as happened in Scotland: the SNP had fairly good support for decades, but few MPs until the tipping point was reached. Now it has 50% support, but almost 100% of Westminster seats. Why was the tipping point reached? Cultural identity rising, living standards falling, entrenched Labour failing. The point was reached–and the Labour vote collapsed.

UKIP has the same problem. So long as it has only 10% or even 15% of votes, it cannot get more than one or two MPs. Were it to get to 25% support, the situation would tip and UKIP would have perhaps 100 MPs. Except that that will probably not happen…

In fact, the Bath constituency mentioned above is instructive: Alan Sked got only 117 votes (0.2%) in 1992; in 2015 the UKIP candidate received nearly 3,000 votes (over 6%), but was still only 5th (Sked came in 6th in 1992)

The difference between UKIP’s situation and that of the Bolsheviks or NSDAP is that UKIP has no really firm ideological or organizational structure. Even if society came to a political tipping point, UKIP might well be unable to take advantage of that.

A new and properly-run social nationalist party could take most of the votes of UKIP as well as those which formerly went to the BNP and others. That however, could only ever be a foundation for electoral success. That success itself would depend on the rising star of the new party meeting the fading star of the old parties. It is a question of timing and of Fate. The tipping point for the whole society would be key.

What Are the Prospects for a Social Nationalist Party in the UK?

Start with the following proposition: the UK has no social nationalist party. All across Europe, social nationalism is rising and has political expression both in parties such as the Front National and in the political discourse generally. In the UK, the latter has started to occur, but not the former. Britain needs a social national party.

Traditionally, the UK has been resistant to social nationalism, the two bits having been severed: the “Conservatives” (mainly) took the national and “Labour” (mainly) took the social. The one waved the Union Jack, the other brandished a poll card in the left hand and a National Insurance card in the right.

After 1945, the Welfare State mainly initiated by Liberals (and even some Conservatives) was taken up and vastly expanded by the Labour Party. That Labour Party was socialist enough to keep its core vote happy most of the time, while never abandoning totally the patriotic background, at least as a theme.

The Thatcher era changed much and one of the things it changed beyond recognition was the Labour Party, which at first lurched toward an anti-national but more “socialist” model under Michael Foot, then a stagnant period under Neil Kinnock, before abandoning socialism altogether and “rebranding” (significant vocabulary) itself as the vaguely “social” and vaguely “national” New Labour. Under New Labour, you could be a Pakistani Muslim, a Jew Zionist, an EU economic migrant, whatever. You were part of the New Labour “British” club.

What New Labour forgot was most of the real British people, left behind in decaying end-of-pier seaside towns, in the post-industrial wastelands of the North (and Scotland) and in many another setting. They lost both their jobs (at least, the decently-paid ones) and their nation, submerged under the waves of mass immigration which were not only tolerated by the Tony Blair/Gordon Brown regime, but actively encouraged (specifically, to destroy the British and especially English national character and culture), though the full extent of the treason did not come to light for several years. Not only politicians were guilty, but also TV talking heads, Andrew Marr being one obvious example.

Scroll on a decade and 2017 is about to dawn. The BNP had two MEPs elected in 2009, then disappeared forever. UKIP rose on the back of social nationalist feeling, had a number of MEPs elected but failed, in 2015, to break through the moat of the First Past The Post electoral system at Westminster: 4 million votes (nearly 13% of the total) and only 1 MP (and that one a Conservative by any other name). No wonder so many people protest by simply not voting. As for UKIP, it has stagnated because it failed to follow the Front National of France into social nationalism. Instead, it espouses a mixed-message of silly “libertarianism” mixed with flag-waving and occasional lip-service in favour of the NHS and public transport. Result? Failure.

The situation now is that Britain has a notionally economically-conservative party which tries to make “national” noises (despite being in the pocket of Jewish-Zionist cosmopolitans) against a Labour Party which has split noisily between the Blair-Brown rump  (including most of its MPs) and a socialist but anti-nationalist membership insurgency led by “accidental” leader Jeremy Corbyn. Former Labour voters are voting with their feet (failing to vote at all) or voting for other parties. There is, also, the Liberal Democrat Party, but that was mortally wounded in 2015 and is now seen as merely a refuge for votes against other parties rather than as a “destination-vote” party voted for in its own right.

The conclusion I draw is that there is a political vacuum. There is a place for a social nationalist party. However, that party does not yet exist. In the next few years, conditions will be perfect for its launch.

Simplicity or Excess?

The spectrum stretching from simplicity through moderation to excess is perennial. Even today, people use Sparta, Athens and Corinth (or, sometimes, Babylon) to illustrate the different lifestyles and societies pertaining to each. In the past, societies have had to enact sumptuary laws in times of economic prosperity, in order to restrain the outward show of wealth by the rich or by those with wealth but who were not also of high social rank.

It is not necessary to go back to ancient Sparta to find societies where a drab uniformity or conformity has been enforced. The socialist societies of the 20th century were cases in point: China, from 1949 to –roughly– 1989, with its hundreds of millions dressed superficially identically in Mao suits (though in fact small differences such as the materials used or the tailoring still indicated rank or status), was the template. Other examples were Albania, Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge etc. To a lesser extent, the Soviet Union and its satellites. Those societies have passed into history now.

The opposite idea, the society of excess or of conspicuous consumption, is the dominant mode at present. Indeed, some of the “worst” (least aesthetic?) expressions of excess are to be seen in precisely those countries so long repressed into austere uniformity, such as China, where it is now not uncommon to see people who are able to spend hundreds or thousands of pounds on a single car and millions of pounds on a house or apartment.

The wealth generated by globalized capitalism, by computerization, automation, robotics etc has resulted in a global class of “owners” whose everyday excess is in stark contrast to the lives of the vast majority: private jets and helicopters, massive motor “yachts” the size of ocean liners, multiple houses and estates, very expensive cars etc. The wealthiest resident of London is said to be a Ukrainian Jew worth somewhere around £15 BILLION. Fifteen thousand million pounds. When one considers what a sum of even one million pounds means to the average British citizen, that sort of figure is put into perspective.

On a lower but still opulent level are the “celebrity” TV faces etc, often better known than the ultra-rich. Occasionally, their financial level is spotlighted by a news report, as when the Sky News person Kay Burley was reported to have spent a few hundred pounds on a bottle of wine in a restaurant.

Somewhere in the middle, between severity and excess, we have a society where moderation does not become austerity and where comfort does not slide into decadence. Where that is, is not always easy to say. What might be regarded as great comfort to many would seem like pinched poverty to, say, a Donald Trump, to a “Russian” Jew oligarch or, a fortiori, to the King of Saudi Arabia or the Sultan of Qatar.

In the societies of Scandinavia, it has long been thought socially-unacceptable to flaunt wealth; the same could be said of Switzerland. The same was so in the Roman Republic before it became the Roman Empire notorious for decadent excess.

It is necessary, of course, to distinguish between wealth and the outward show of wealth. However, both should, ideally, be moderated, in the interests of social cohesion and, indeed, social functioning.

Basic Income will moderate poverty; caps on income, capital and landowning will moderate both excessive wealth and the flaunting show of wealth. The society of the future will not be one of a few wealthy people and a large number of poor people; neither can it be one of enforced uniformity. It must be a society in which everyone has enough and some have more than enough but without thereby being or seeming vulgar.

From Secure Base to National Power

I have blogged about my plan for a “safe zone” in a region such as the South West of England, where forces of social nationalism, of culture and of civilization can be concentrated when, at the same time, much of the UK, particularly the urban wasteland, becomes gradually a horrible dystopia.

In the safe zone, it will be possible over time (perhaps only a few years) to take over local and county councils and, in respect of Westminster constituencies, to depose sitting MPs, once enough social nationalists are resident in the zone. Our people will be found in every official chamber and office, every business, in the three emergency services, in the common-rooms of schools and universities, on the farms and in the telephone company.

The question arises, does the safe zone only mutate and develop into a mini-ethnostate or does it expand beyond its (notional) borders? Does it move from local, county and regional power to national contention? If it does, how does this happen?

A major point to note here is that, at the same time as the safe zone is developing, there will be the formation of a social nationalist party or movement, to which people from all over the UK can belong. “Outstations” will exist even in areas not likely to be friendly to national renewal, such as London, Birmingham and the other urban sprawls which have majority non-European populations. Once this political party has even a handful of MPs from the safe zone, it can expand its influence wider. Also, the safe zone will exercize a magnetic attraction to those living outside it.

There may be a social collapse in the UK, following either war or social breakdown. More likely will be a gradual slide into a less civilized, less cultured way of life, where things such as electricity supply, social care, NHS, trains etc still exist, but operate, steadily, less well than before. In those circumstances, it will be possible for the political party to contrast the safe zone with the degenerate part of the UK and to make political capital out of that contrast.

Only in the case of a complete breakdown of the powers of the UK state would it be necessary to think in terms of paramilitary activity. In any event, there would be already-existing military units willing to save the State and society by alliance with the safe zone ethnostate.

The party or political movement will have to build its strength and await the right time, both electorally and otherwise. The way the UK is going, it cannot be very long before a revolutionary situation of some kind develops, i.e. before the British people are tired of being lied to and ready to cast off the System parties which have no solutions. Then the party can strike in both electoral and other ways.

Seismic Shifts in the World

There are now huge changes happening in the world power structure. Russia is on a roll, strategically, at the same time as its underpinning economy is struggling.

2016 has been a successful year for Russia in the military-diplomatic realm. Its support for the Assad government of Syria has proven decisive. The rebel forces have been all but vanquished and Russia sits for now unchallenged in Syria and, thus, in the most strategic part of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.

It scarcely matters that, on paper, Russia’s economy is not prospering. Stalin built up the Soviet Union to be a world power while the Russian and other peoples under his rule suffered under socio-economic conditions that make today’s Russia look like a land of plenty in a fairy tale.

At the same time, Donald Trump’s victory in the United States is a victory for Russia and (I hope) for peace between Russia and the USA. If Russia helped to procure Trump’s election via “active measures”, then so much the better. It makes a change from the Israel lobby pulling all the strings and, even if Trump is (as he may be) entirely unsuited for the role of head of government or head of state, at least Israel-controlled warmonger Hillary Clinton was prevented from exercizing power and fomenting more war.

In the Far East, traditionally one of Russia’s weakest areas, influence is felt in the latest sayings of the president of the Philippines. American influence is waning fast  in a region where Chinese power is waxing.

As for Europe, the rise of populism and, to a lesser extent, social nationalism, plays to Russia’s strengths: tradition, white European culture and history, shared values, shared hopes for a better future (and against globalism, multiracialism, China, Zionism, Islamism, Americanism).

In France, Marine le Pen has every chance of becoming President in 2017. In Austria, the Freedom Party narrowly missed in its Presidential bid but is well ahead of all rivals and looks like winning the general election of 2018 (in theory also may be but unlikely to be in 2017). Even in Germany, the more nationalistic forces are increasing in influence.

All of the above leads to a situation in 2017-2018 in which the broadly social-nationalist agenda can be carried forward.

A Wildlife Grid for the UK

A few years ago, I began to tweet occasionally about the necessity for a wildlife grid, that is, connected strips or plots of uncultivated land to allow birds and animals to travel and live safely. Around the same time as I started to tweet on the subject, I read that one or two charities had started pilot schemes. It has been heartening to see in recent weeks that this activity has apparently been stepped up.

We are now used to the concepts of nature reserves, national parks etc. The wildlife grid complements these. Not that nature is expunged elsewhere: there are landowners and farmers who are not completely hostile to wildlife. However, modern farming (except organic or biodynamic) is often to a great degree inimical to the environment: pesticides, herbicides, intensive use of land, grubbing up of hedgerows. The wildlife grid mitigates the damage by allowing nature respite and allowing animals to travel between areas suitable for them and through areas otherwise unsuitable.

There is another part of the UK which can help wildlife, if properly used. There are a million or more acres of land in the UK used as private gardens. Some people in modest houses concrete or tarmac their “front gardens”, destroy hedges (replacing them with walls or fencing), uproot trees, lay what is left entirely to lawn. All harmful. Others however are now learning to plant hedging, plant bushes and trees, keep a part of the garden or gardens wild, select bee-friendly plants etc and to avoid use of harmful pesticides and herbicides. Even the (often derided) “water feature” can be very helpful to wildlife. Also, there are ways of helping various creatures (birds, hedgehogs, bees) via the installation of suitable places for them to live or feed in. The wildlife grid not only complements all of that but comprises that, in part.

The aim need not be a wildlife grid owned or run by the State or even by large charities. The grid will consist of all sorts of variously-held land: national parks, nature reserves, private farmland and parkland, wildflower strips alongside roads, private gardens, woodland, unused land. What matters is what is done with the land, rather than who owns it. In any case, when it comes to small areas or narrow strips, no one large organization could monitor and control all of that.

It might be asked then whether this is not all self-functioning. Up to a point, but what would be useful even so would be a secretariat to map the UK in terms of a wildlife grid, to identify areas of the country where gaps exist and, assuming existence of a suitable trust with capital and income, to buy land to fill in such gaps, planting trees, creating whole forests. Also, such a body  would be able to explain the concept to interested landowners, as well as being able to conduct public relations education and so on.

The wildlife grid will be part of a future programme to place wildlife at the centre of urban, suburban and rural policy in the UK.