“The talent of the strategist is to identify the decisive point and to concentrate everything on it, removing forces from secondary fronts and ignoring lesser objectives.”
Those words of Clausewitz are often taken to encapsulate the essence of strategy. How are they applied to the socio-political question in the UK (England, primarily) from the social-national point of view?
“The Decisive Point”
The “decisive point” or objective, ultimately, is the formation of a British ethnostate as an autonomous part of a Eurasian ethnostate based on the Northern European and Russian peoples. However, within the UK itself and before that, the objective must first be drawn less widely, as political power within the UK’s own borders.
The Gaining of Political Power in the UK
The sine qua non of gaining the sort of political power required is the existence of a political party. More than that, a party which is uncompromizing in its wish to entirely reform both State and society.
History is replete with examples of states which have seemed not even just powerful but actually eternal, yet which have collapsed. Ancient Rome, though perhaps not a “state” in our modern sense, is perhaps the one most embedded in the Western consciousness. More recently, the Soviet Union and its satellite states. In between those two examples (but among many others) we might cite the pre-1914 European “settlement” based on the empires and kingdoms which collapsed during and after the First World War: Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, the Ottoman Empire.
The main point to understand is that, in situations of crisis on the large scale, it is not the political party with the most money, erudition, developed policy or even membership that comes out on top, but the party with the most will or determination. That means the most disciplined party under the leadership of the most determined leader.
It is better to have a party consisting of only 1,000 which is tightly-disciplined and self-disciplined than one of 100,000 which is a floundering mass of contradictions. When a national crisis occurs, such as 1917-1921 in Russia or 1929-1933 in Germany (to take two obvious examples), the people instinctively turn to the party perceived to be strongest, not strongest in numbers, money, intellectuality or number of members, but strongest in the will, the will to power.
A party requires leadership, members, ideology, policy and money. Everything comes from the leadership and the membership, in symbiosis. In practical terms, this means that policy is open to free discussion, up to the point where a decision is made as to what is party policy as such. Also, it has to be understood that a party requires money as a tank requires fuel. To have endless fundraising drives, hunts for wealthy donors etc demeans and dispirits the membership. Having a “tithing” system renders such other methods unnecessary. The members sacrifice an agreed amount of their post-tax income, such as 10%. The party organizes itself and its message to the general population using that money.
As a rule of thumb in contemporary Britain, it might be said that, on average, each member will provide something like £2,000 per year to the party. A party of even 1,000 members will therefore have an annual income of £2 million, enough to buy not only propaganda and administration but real property as a base. By way of comparison, the Conservative Party in 2017 has an income of about £3.5 million.
It must be understood that elections are only one way to power, but they are indispensable in England, for historical-cultural reasons. A party which cannot win elections loses credibility rapidly once that party is large. In the initial phase, no-one expects the party to win Westminster or even local council seats, but after that, it has to win and so grow, or deflate as the BNP did and as UKIP is doing now. The problem small parties have under the English electoral system is that a Westminster seat can be won only with, at a minimum, about 30% (and usually 40% or more) of votes. The insurgent party is in danger of spreading itself too thinly, in every way. UKIP’s history illustrates the point: in 2015, about 12% of votes cast (nearly 4 million), but only the one MP with which they, in effect, started. The answer is to concentrate the vote. That is done by concentrating the members and supporters of the party geographically.
I have blogged previously about the creation of safe zones and especially one primary safe zone (possibly in the South West of England). If the members and supporters of the party gradually relocate into that zone or zones, many things become easier, from protection of buildings, meetings, exhibitions etc to the election of councillors and MPs. I have also blogged about the magnetic attraction such a safe zone might exercise over people in the UK as a whole.
The Decisive Time
The “decisive time” cannot be predicted. In Russia, Lenin (at the time in foreign exile) thought that the 1905 uprising was “the revolution”. He was wrong. He also thought that the first (February, old-style) 1917 uprising was not “the” revolution. He was wrong again. It was.
Lenin had to hurry back to Russia (arriving belatedly in April 1917, old-style) not only to try to take control (he failed in that and had to foment his own coup d’etat in October 1917) but to avoid being sidelined and so becoming an almost irrelevant footnote to history.
In Germany after 1929, Hitler likewise was not in control of events. In the end, economic near-collapse and political turmoil gave him the chance to win enough votes (33% in 1932) to form a coalition government which led on to full power in 1933, after the NSDAP achieved a higher –though still minority– popular vote (44%).
In other words, both Lenin and Hitler were the pawns of Fate while striving to be the masters of events. They had something in common though: highly-disciplined and ideologically-motivated parties behind them.
At the age of 60, the last thing which is convenient for me is to form a political party. I have no need of such an activity as a hobby or absorbing interest. I am coming to the idea out of duty, out of a realization that something has to be done and out of an understanding that something can be done, if Fate concurs. I am not willing to compromize on overall ideology or on the way things are organized within such a party. I shall only establish a political party (which may become a movement) if it can be done on a serious basis. However, there is a need for a party to speak for the British people and there is a widening political vacuum in which such a party can thrive and grow.